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Rosenberg: Soviet Refugee Status

REFUGEE STATUS FOR SOVIET JEWISH
IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES
Victor Rosenberg
INTRODUCTION
Among the issues discussed at the November 2001 meeting
of American President George W. Bush and Russian President
Vladimir Putin was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,2 which denies
most-favored-nation status to countries restricting the right of
emigration. Although the Jackson-Vanik Amendment appears to
be obsolete with reference to post-Soviet Russia, which allows free
emigration, it remains on the books, highlighting past and present
3
American concern with the Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union.
Official American concern for Russian Jews, fostered at
least in part by Jewish lobbying, existed during tsarist days.
During that period, however, the right of Jews both to emigrate
from the Russian Empire and to enter the United States was largely
unrestricted. When American concern came to the fore again
during the 1950s, especially after 1967, the issue was the right of
Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. Soon, however, increasing
numbers of Soviet Jewish emigrants preferred to go to the United
States rather than to Israel. This led to policy debates, both within
the American Jewish community and within the American
government, which intensified in the late 1980s and early 1990s
when the Soviet Union liberalized its emigration policy.
This is a study primarily of changing American policy
toward granting refugee status to Soviet Jewish immigrants from
the time that liberalization of the Soviet emigration policy led to a
'J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University; Ph. D.
History, Kent State University.
2 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (2000).
3 A bill was recently introduced in Congress to remove Russia from the

Jackson-Vanik amendment, and thereby grant it most-favored nation status.
See, 149 Cong. Rec S3721 (daily ed. March 13, 2003). However, the chances

that this bill will be passed into law are slim due to Russia's opposition to the
U.S. invasion of Iraq. See Ken Guggenheim, Jackson-Vanik Stays Due to Split
on Iraq, Moscow TIMES, April 28, 2003 availableat http://ncsj.org/AuxPages/
042803AP.shtml (last visited May 13, 2003). This particular bill may not pass,

but I assume that sooner or later the Jackson-Vanik Amendment will be repealed
with regard to Russia.
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huge increase in their number. At the center of the discussion is
the Lautenberg Amendment, 4 first passed in 1989, which grants
presumptive refugee status to Jews and members of certain other
groups from the former Soviet Union. However, to understand the
policies of the past decade, it is necessary to sketch the history of
American concern for Soviet Jewish emigration in the two decades
preceding the Lautenberg Amendment. In particular, this study
seeks to answer the questions of (1) why the United States granted
refugee status to people not sufficiently persecuted to meet the
ordinary definition of "refugee" and (2) why the United States
largely, but never completely, retreated from that position when
circumstances changed. The focus of this study is on Soviet Jews,
but where relevant it will also discuss Armenians and Evangelical
Christians (Pentecostals).
JEWISH EMIGRATION
THROUGH 1972

AND

AMERICAN RESPONSE

Emigration from the Soviet Union was always difficult for
Jews and non-Jews alike, and from 1948 to 1970 total emigration
was only 60,000. 5 Just after the death of Stalin in 1953, Israel
raised the issue of Jewish emigration with Deputy Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko, resulting only in permission for some parents to
join their Israeli children. 6 On several occasions in the late 1950s,
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev responded negatively or
evasively to this issue. The Soviet government did, however, allow
some Polish Jews to return to Poland. Thereafter, they emigrated
to Israel.7
Americans were also beginning to express interest in the
issue. For example, Eleanor Roosevelt, visiting the Soviet Union
in 1957, complained to Premier Khrushchev that it was difficult for
4 Foreign

Operations, Export Financing, & Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-167, §§ 599D, 599E, 103 Stat. 1195, 1262 (1989)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157) (2000).
5 Sharon S. Russell, Migration Patterns of US. Foreign Policy Interest, in
THREATENED PEOPLES, THREATENED BORDERS 81 (Michael S. Teitelbaum &

M Yron Weiner, eds., 1995) [hereinafter THREATENED PEOPLES].
2 NORA LEVIN, THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE 1917: PARADOX OF
SURVIVAL 583 (1988).
'2 id. at 585.
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Soviet Jews to visit Israel, let alone emigrate. Khrushchev agreed,
but said, "the time will come when everyone who wants to go will
be able to go." 8 In a 1959 letter to Khrushchev, Vice-President
Richard Nixon called for permission for Soviet citizens (not
exclusively Jews) to emigrate in order to join family members in
the United States. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko
responded 9that such requests would be "considered with proper
attention."
The June 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt,
Syria, and Jordan intensified both pride among Soviet Jews and
official Soviet anti-Semitism. One consequence was the beginning
of the Jewish emigration movement, in which some Jews began to
enlist outside support. For example, on August 6, 1969, eighteen
Jewish families from Georgia wrote to United Nations Secretary
General U Thant through Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. This
example inspired Soviet Jews elsewhere to write letters and sign
petitions in 1969 and 1970, variously addressed to U Thant, the
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, prominent Soviet
officials, and President Zalman Shazar of Israel. These messages
often resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of their signers.'°
Further worldwide publicity came with the 1970 arrest and
trial of a group of twelve people who had plotted the hijacking of
an airplane from Leningrad to Israel as a protest against Soviet
restrictions on emigration. Western protests over the harshness of
the sentences, including two death sentences, led to their
mitigation. 1 Moreover, the trial focused further attention on the
plight of people who applied to emigrate. Applicants faced loss of
their jobs or even arrest for applying, and emigration required an
invitation from a relative in Israel; character references from the
applicant's boss, a Communist Party representative, and a trade
union representative; and consent of all family members, including
parents of adult children. Even if these conditions were met,
approval of emigration was not assured, and many people were
repeatedly rejected. Nevertheless, emigration did increase in 1971,

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, ON MY OWN 229 (Harper 1958).
9 2 LEVIN, supra note 6, at 585.
1o 2 id. at 651, 661-62.

" 2 id. at 672-80.
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as 14,300 Soviet Jews emigrated to Israel, compared with 4,300
from 1968 to 1970.12
Meanwhile, Western support was increasing, most notably
at a conference in Brussels from February 23 to 25, 1971,
at which foreign Jewish leaders demonstrated their solidarity with
Soviet Jews. Soon after, the Soviet Union began to grant more exit
visas to Jews.' 3
In the United States that year, both Congress and the Nixon
Administration began to respond to the increase in Soviet Jewish
emigration. Democratic Representative Edward Koch of New
York and Republican Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey
introduced bills allowing 30,000 special immigrant visas for Soviet
Jews. 14 Only 250 Soviet Jews entered the United States in 1971.
However, on October 1, 1971, Attorney General John Mitchell
announced a new policy allowing Soviet Jews to enter the United
States by parole. Mitchell welcomed the first four immigrants to
benefit from this policy on January 7, 1972.15
As the Soviet Union sought d6tente with the United States,
Jewish immigration increased over the next two years, to 31,903 in
1972 and 34,733 in 1973.16 However, there were still refusals, and
this led some American politicians, most notably one Senator and
one Representative, into action.
THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT
On October 4, 1972, the White House announced that
Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev would be
coming to the United States to sign a Soviet-American trade
agreement. That same day, Democratic Senator Henry Jackson of
Washington first introduced an amendment to ban the granting of
most-favored-nation status to Communist countries that restricted
emigration. On October 10, Democrat Charles Vanik of Ohio
2 2 id. at 681-82.
13 2 id. at 694, 696.
14 Henry S. Moyer, Letter to the Editor, Let Soviet Jews In, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug.
23, 1971, at 28.
15Soviet Jewish Family Welcomed by Mitchell, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1972, at
33; see also infra text accompanying notes 45-47.
162 LEVIN, supra note 6, at 696.
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introduced a similar amendment in the House of Representatives.
On September 26, 1973, the House Ways and Means Committee
adopted what became known, then and since, as the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, linking most-favored-nation status to the granting of
emigration.' 7 At the same time, the Soviets continued to grant
18
emigration visas to an increasing number of Jews.
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974
was officially titled Chapter 12, Subchapter IV: Trade Relations
With Countries Not Currently Receiving Nondiscriminatory
Treatment. This amendment provided that as of January 3, 1975,
most-favored-nation status would not be given to "any nonmarket
economy country" if the President determined that the country
to
opportunity
or
right
the
citizens
its
"denies
emigrate... impose[s] more than a nominal tax on emigration or
on the visas or other documents required for emigration . . ."or
"impose[s] more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge
on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to
emigrate to the country of his choice."' 9 Additionally, the
President was given the right to waive the amendment if given
"assurances that the emigration practices of that country [will]
to the achievement of the objectives
henceforth lead substantially
20
amendment].,
of [the
On December 11, 1973, the House passed the JacksonVanik Amendment by a 319-80 vote, followed by the Senate's 8821
0 vote on December 13, 1974. Meanwhile, the Soviets agreed to
allow at least 45,000 Jews to emigrate every year, but as historian
Raymond Garthoff has pointed out, "[t]he more the Soviets gave..
. the more Jackson demanded, to the discomfort of even other
senators seeking a favorable outcome." 22 President Gerald Ford
signed the Trade Act of 1974, with its inclusion of the Jackson" 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (a).
18 HENRY KISSINGER, YEARS OF UPHEAVAL
RAYMOND

L.

250-51, 990 (1982); see also

GARTHOFF, DtTENTE AND CONFRONTATION: AMERICAN-SOVIET

347, 401, 444-45 (Rev. ed. 1994).
U.S.C. § 2432 (a).
Id.§ 2432 (c)(2)(B).
KISSINGER, supra note 18, at 991; see also PETRUS BUWALDA, THEY DID

RELATIONS FROM NIXON TO REAGAN,
'919
20
21

NOT DWELL ALONE: JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION 1967-1990,

106 (1997).

22 GARTHOFF, supra note 18, at 461.
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1975,

nevertheless

"express[ing] ... reservations about the wisdom of legislative
language that can only be seen as objectionable and discriminatory
by other sovereign states. ' 23 Jackson, however, had various
reasons for his actions. He was interested in Jewish emigration for
its own sake and also had hopes for the 1976 Presidential election.
Moreover, he opposed detente and increased trade with the Soviet
Union, and actually led rather than followed the opinion of Jewish
groups with his amendment. 24 In Henry Kissinger's
words,
25
"Jackson unfortunately wanted an issue, not a solution."
Although (or more likely because) the Soviets were
conciliatory), on October 18, 1974, Jackson spoke on the White
House lawn implying Soviet submission and an American (and a
personal) victory. Feeling the need to save face, in January 1975
the Soviet government rejected the Jackson-Vanik Amendment by
refusing to put into affect the 1972 Soviet-American Trade
Agreement. Meanwhile, Jewish emigration fell from 35,000 in
1973 to 21,000 in 1974 and 13,000 in 1975.26 As Kissinger
explained, "[lar from spurring emigration, the
Jackson
27
amendment in fact wound up substantially reducing it."
On January 5, 1979, Vanik publicly said that he might
support a removal of the restrictions, however, Jackson vehemently
opposed this. At the same time, President Jimmy Carter, noting
that Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union was increasing
(amounting to almost 30,000 in 1978 and reaching 51,000 in
1979), hoped to extend most-favored-nation status to the Soviet
Union shortly after his 1979 summit meeting with Soviet leader
Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna. 28 However, the collapse of d6tente
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (and the American
response to it) led to a sharp decrease in Jewish emigration to
9,447 in 1981, the lowest number since 1970.29
23
24

Remarks Upon Signing the Trade Act of 1974, 1 PUB.PAPERS 3 (1975).
Id. at 505, 508; see also PAULA STERN, WATER'S EDGE: DOMESTIC POLITICS

AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
25 KISSINGER, supra note
26 GARTHOFF, supra note
27 KISSINGER, supra note
28 GARTHOFF, supra note
29Id.
at 1116 n.110.

21, 210-11 (1979).

18, at 996.
18, at 508-09, 512-14.
18, at 251.
18, at 800, 810.
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Meanwhile, another issue arose which stirred debate within
the American Jewish community.
Originally, world Jewry,
including American, had agitated specifically for the right of
Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. However, increasing numbers of
Jews "dropped out," as was said, preferring to emigrate to the
United States. Thus, in the 1970s, of almost 250,000 emigrants,
150,000 went to Israel and 64,000 to the United States. In contrast,
in the 1980s, of the 117,00030 emigrants, 29,000 went to Israel and
79,000 to the United States.
In part, those American Jews who favored denying aid to
"dropouts" reflected the position of Israel. However, the United
States government opposed this position, even matching grants to
local welfare agencies to aid Soviet (and Southeast Asian, African,
Cuban, and Haitian) immigrants. By January 11, 1982, however,
at the urging of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) began to aid only those
Soviet Jews with first-degree relatives in countries other than
Israel. 3 1 As Drora Kass stated in the New York Times, the dropouts
were in effect delivering an ideological blow to Israel, which saw
itself as the haven for oppressed Jews. 32 Moreover, the words of
Leon Dulzin, Chairman of the Jewish Agency, adumbrated the
arguments that would be used in the 1990s by the American
government to restrict the granting of refugee status, albeit with a
different motive: "They are not refugees. A refugee is someone
who is compelled to leave and has no place to go. There are no
Jewish refugees today.
Jews seeking a haven and a new life have
33
somewhere to go."
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union drastically reduced the
number of Jews it allowed to emigrate in the early 1980s,
rendering much of this argument temporarily moot. For example,
in 1981, 9,447 Soviet Jews emigrated; in 1982, 2,688; in 1983,
30

Russell, supra note 5, at 71.

312 LEVIN, supra note 6, at 747-48. However, it must be noted that HIAS had

rejected the Begin proposal in 1979. See Drora Kass & Seymour M. Lipset,
America's New Wave of Jewish Immigrants, N. Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 7, 1980, at
44; see also HIAS Modifies Resettlement Policy, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee
for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 1, 1982, at 4, 4-5.
32 Kass & Lipset, supra note 31, at 44.
33Id. at 112 (quoting Leon Dulzin).
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1,314; and in 1985, 893. 34 However, the accession of Mikhail
Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in 1985 would soon lead to a change in this policy
and a consequent reopening of the debate.
THE LATE
POLICY

1980s:

QUESTIONING

OF

AMERICAN

Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union began to
accelerate most markedly in 1988. Whereas only 3,694 Soviet
immigrants were admitted into the United States in fiscal year
1987, for fiscal year 1988, the Administration found it necessary
to increase the ceiling on admissions from the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe from 15,000 to 30,000.36 As Refugee Reports
stated:
Having long promoted free emigration from the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the United States
now faces what one voluntary agency official has
termed a "crisis of success," as liberalized migration
policies in many of the Eastern Bloc countries have
contributed to near-record outflows in 1987 and
1988, and the U.S.
government struggles to
37
them.
accommodate
As increasing numbers of Jews and other groups, especially
Armenians, were able to leave the Soviet Union, controversy arose
over their status as refugees. According to the Refugee Act of
1980, in order to qualify as a refugee, a person must be a victim of
"persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
34 2 LEVIN, supra note

6, at 750.

Soviet Emigration Increase, Southeast Asia Crisis- The Refutgee Admissions
Numbers Game, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington,
D.C.), Feb. 26, 1988, at 9, 10.
36 State Department Seeks Privately Financed Admissions for
Some Soviets,
REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 12,
1988,
at 11, 11.
37 Large Outflows in Soviet Union/Eastern Europe Create "Crisis of Success,"
REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 14,
1988, at 2, 2-3.
35
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or political opinion." 38 Republican Senator Alan K. Simpson of
Wyoming, who would be a leading opponent of liberal granting of
refugee status over the next decade, was quoted as telling Secretary
of State George Shultz that "the American people will respond
always to a true refugee, but not to a gimmick refugee."39 This
questioning was echoed by Immigration and Nationalization
Service Commissioner Alan Nelson: "We must recognize that
some of those wishing to depart the Soviet Union are not
refugees," but "are, rather, prospective immigrants, and as such,
they should enter this country according to the requirements of our
own immigration laws.' 4° Indeed, some Soviets were admitted
without even claiming to be persecuted.'
Still, through fiscal year 1988, refugee status was almost
always granted to Soviet immigrants: the approval rate was 99
Then, however, a sharp increase in
percent that year.42
budgetary pressures on the United
with
combined
immigration
States to create what Refugee Reports called a "receptive climate"
for rethinking the almost automatic granting of refugee status to
Soviet Jews.
Among those questioning the automatic granting of refugee
status was Attorney General Edwin Meese, who wrote an August
4, 1988 letter to National Security Advisor Colin Powell. Meese
did say that the United States should not "close the door on any
person who has been given an expectation of admission to the
United States," and that INS officials should be "as generous as
possible in their application of the refugee definition," further
stating that those not granted refugee status "will be considered for
38

Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended

at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (2000)).
39 Administration Says Not Everyone Leaving the Soviet Union is a Refugee,
REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 14,
at 6, 6.
1988,
40 Id.
(quoting Nelson's written testimony before Congress).
41Kathleen Newland, The Impact of US. Refugee Policies on US. Foreign
Policy: A Case of the Tail Wagging the Dog?, in THREATENED PEOPLES, supra
note 5, at 207.
42 Jews, Pentecostals Challenge INS Denials of Refugee Status for Soviet

Emigres, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.),
Mar. 17, 1989, at 6, 6 [hereinafter Jews, Pentecostals Challenge].
43 Id.
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entry to the United States under my parole authority." However,
he also said, "[c]urrent practices in processing Soviet emigres
appear not to conform with the requirements established by the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980," and that "procedures
followed by the Embassy
in Moscow must be brought into sync
44
procedures."
INS
with
Continuing along these lines, on November 17, 1988,
Secretary of State George Shultz asked new Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh to apply the INS Refugee standard of a "wellfounded fear of persecution," and Soviet Jews in Rome were first
denied refugee status in September 1988. Denials reached 8
percent from September to December, more than doubling in
January 1989. Thornburgh did, on the other hand, grant parole
status to all Soviets in Rome who were not granted
refugee status,
45
Moscow.
in
month
per
as well as to up to 2,000
This concession was unpopular, however, because parolees,
unlike refugees, were not eligible for medical benefits, government
funding for transportation to and resettlement in the United States,
nor adjustment of their status to permanent resident. Additionally,
unlike refugees, parolees needed to provide an affidavit of support
from a relative or a sponsor in order to guarantee that they would
not become public charges, and there were many applicants unable
to do this.4 Yet, at the same time, Thornburgh described the
granting of parole status as an "interim measure," stating that he
had requested that the Office of Legislative Affairs in the Justice
Department propose legislation establishing special
immigrant
'A 7
circumstances.
"special
in
status for some applicants
44 Soviet Refugees, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees,
and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 128,

130 (1989) [hereinafter Refugee Hearings] (letter from Edwin Meese, Attorney
General, to Lt. General Colin Powell) (emphasis added).
45 Jews, PentecostalsChallenge, supra note 42, at 7.
46 Id.; see also Refugee Hearings,supra note 44, at 121 (statement of Alan C.

Nelson, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service), 150 (prepared

statement of Nancy P. Kingsbury, Director, Foreign Economic Assistance
Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting
Office), 309 (Jonathan K. Baum, Mark Blocker, Gary Finder, & Adrienne C.
Lalak: Report to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International

Law, "Refugee Status for Jews Emigrating from the Soviet Union").
47

1988 Statistical Issue,

REFUGEE

REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees,

Washington, D.C.), Dec. 16, 1988, at 1, 1.
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In 1989, as Soviet emigration increased further, the new
presidential administration of George Bush reacted ambivalently.
On the one hand, on April 5, the administration proposed an
increase in the number of Soviet refugees from 25,000 to 50,000
for the year. It also proposed legislation allowing the president to
admit up to 30,000 people in each of the next five years "for
foreign policy reasons" as special immigrants with permanent
resident status under Immigration and Naturalization Act section
101(a)(27).48 It was also intended that Soviets who had already
entered as parolees would be granted permanent resident status.
On March 24, the State Department had already requested $100
million in additional funds, $85 million of which would be
allocated for admission of refugees.49
Congress was also active in promoting increased Soviet
Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of
immigration.
Massachusetts and Republican Senator Robert Kasten of
Wisconsin sponsored a bill which would "shift $150 million
of... available funds to support the processing and resettlement of
an additional 25,000 Soviet Jews and other refugees," in other
words, likewise proposing an increase in Soviet refugee
admissions from 25,000 to 50,0000
Concern over funding led to additional measures by the
Bush administration. In December 1988, the State Department
announced that in addition to refugees funded in full by the federal
government, 6,000 semi-funded and 2,500 privately funded slots
would be opened for Soviet refugees in fiscal year 1989. 5 1 At this
time, the American Embassy in Moscow presented a letter to
Soviet visa applicants telling them, "[ilncreasingly, Soviet citizens
who immigrate to the United States will be asked to establish that
they, with the assistance of their U.S. sponsors, [will be] able to
support themselves without financial assistance from the United

See 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(27) (2000) for numerous definitions of what
constitutes a special immigrant.
49 Congress Considers Proposals to Increase Soviet Emigre Flow, 66 INTERP.
41

REL.

398-99 (1989).

50 135 CONG. REC. 3154-55 (1989).
51Alternatives Proliferate for Soviet Emigres, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee
for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 27, 1989, at 10, 11.
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States," and that they "should begin 52now to discuss finances with
[their] relatives in the United States."
In March 1989, Secretary of State James Baker told
American Jewish leaders that the Soviet Jewish refugee issue was
one of the State Department's largest budgetary problems.13 This
budgetary issue would continue to affect American policy.
Beginning on October 1, 1989, the administration implemented the
policy of processing Soviet refugees in Moscow rather than in
Vienna and Rome. In doing so, it intended both to save money in
an increasingly expensive process and to inform would-be refugees
of their status before they left the Soviet Union. In essence, the
measure meant that Soviet Jews, all of whom left with Israeli visas,
would not be able to apply for admission to the United States as
refugees once they were in a third country (i.e., Austria or Italy). 4
As Immigration and Nationalization Service Commissioner Nelson
pointed out, the Soviet Jews did have the option of going to Israel:
"Elsewhere, and under normal procedures, such 'offers of firm
resettlement' are bars against further consideration for the U.S.
55
refugee program."
The change of venue was strongly criticized. Denial rates
were significantly higher in Moscow than in Rome and Vienna,
averaging approximately 20 percent in Rome and Vienna, but 46
percent in Moscow, including 54 percent in January 1989 and 87
percent in March.56 Moreover, half of the denials in Rome and
Vienna were overturned on appeal as a result of help from the
52Id.
53 BUWALDA,

supra note 21, at 190.

54 U.S. Set to Judge All Soviet Refugee Claims in Moscow, 50,000 Places
for

Soviet Refugee Admissions Requested, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for
Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 22, 1989, at 1, 2 [hereinafter US. Set to
Judge]; Processing of Soviet Refugees: Joint HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Europe and the Middle East of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 88-89 (1979) [hereinafter Processing
Hearing] (exchange between Representative Lamar Smith, R-Texas, and
Princeton Lyman, Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs).
55 Congress, Administration Offer Legislative Response to Soviet
Refugee
Surge, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Apr.
28, 1989, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Congress, Administration Offer Legislative
Response].
56 US. Set to Judge, supra note 54, at 4.
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Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). As Jewel S. Lafontant,
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, explained:
When I talked to the HIAS people in Rome, I said
to them that I did not feel that the applicants who
went before the INS knew how to present their
cases properly. They were at a loss as to what to
say. They could not prove that they were actually
persecuted.57
Karl Zukerman, executive vice president of HIAS, noted
that not only were HIAS representatives failing to aid prospective
refugees in Moscow, but also that Moscow lacked a~rivate space
where applicants could speak about their persecution.
Additionally, criticisms were voiced by a group sent to
Rome in January 1989 by World Relief, part of the National
Association of Evangelicals, to investigate the denial of refugee
status to ninety-nine Pentecostals. The World Relief team found
that different INS examiners approved applicants at vastly different
rates; interviews were generally superficial, averaging ten minutes;
and examiners were sometimes hostile or inattentive. Moreover,
"[iln some instances, attempts by applicants to present their 'story,
were specifically cut off."W
CHALLENGES TO STRICTER STANDARDS
On April 5, 1989, Assistant Attorney General Thomas
Boyd wrote to Chairman Bruce Morrison of the House
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law,
explaining that because so many more people were being allowed
to leave the Soviet Union, the character of the emigrant pool had
changed. In particular, increasing numbers of people were leaving
not to flee persecution, but solely for purposes of family reunion or
economic opportunities. 60 Yet some observers perceived the irony
7Id.at 5.
ld. at 6.
5
9 Jews, Pentecostals Challenge, supra note 42, at 6-8.
60 Refugee Hearings, supra note 44, at 89 (letter from Thomas M. Boyd,
Assistant Attorney General, to Bruce A. Morrison, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Refugee, and International Law).
8
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of the situation. In the words of one refugee in Ladispoli, Italy, in
1989, "[t]he American government fought for us to leave. It's
very difficult for us to understand why America is now rejecting
us., 61
There was also indignation in Congress, as expressed, for
example, by Bruce Morrison, a Democratic Representative from
Connecticut: "The President calls on the Soviets to open up
emigration. At the same time, his administration makes it
impossible for Soviet Jews to be processed expeditiously and fairly
into the U.S. .,62
Likewise, in early 1989, fifty-four Senators wrote a letter to
Secretary of State James Baker and Attorney General Thornburgh
expressing concern over the denial of refugee status to some Soviet
Jews in Rome as well as over pending delays of at least a year in
processing applications in Moscow. They wrote, "[p]ersonnel
ceilings notwithstanding, is there not a way to deal with this
backlog so that the U.S. government does not replace the Soviet
63
government as the obstacle to departure?"
The letter further called on the administration to return to
the policy of regarding all Soviet Jews as refugees, noting the
history of anti-Semitism in Russia and the Soviet Union and
pointing out that Gorbachev's reforms "are encouraging, but have
yet to take hold in the daily lives of Soviet Jews and other religious
minorities." 64 The letter further noted that "one byproduct of
glasnost is that extremist groups, including virulent anti-Semites,
are growing increasingly outspoken." 65 Similarly, HIAS issued a
report on, February 10, 1989 referring to this history and
unpredictability, concluding that "it is reasonable for Soviet Jews
' 66
to fear persecution on account of their religion if they return.
Additionally, Jews and Pentecostals were concerned lest
67
Gorbachev and his reforms not last.
61

135 CONG. REc. 14,677 (1989).

Id. at 14,678.
63
1Id.at 3155.
62

64 id.
65

id.

66 Jews, Pentecostals Challenge,supra note

42, at 6, 8.
See Refugee Hearings, supra note 44, at 23 (statement of Hon. Gerry
Sikorski, Representative from Minnesota); ProcessingHearing, supra note 54,
67
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THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
The above comments by the fifty-four Senators and by
HIAS foreshadowed another issue that came to the fore in 1989:
that of presumptive refugee status for Soviet Jewish immigrants.
As HIAS pointed out:
The notion of applying a "presumption of
persecution" to the situation of Soviet Jews is
hardly a revolutionary idea. There is a precedent
for it in the case of refugees from Indochina and,
indeed, precedent in the operation of an informal
presumption in favor of Soviet Jews up until last
68
fall.
Such a presumption of persecution would eliminate neither
personal interviews nor annual ceilings on admissions of refugees.
However, membership in a designated group, in this case Soviet
Jews, would mean that the INS officer was to presume an
individual to be a refugee unless there were persuasive contrary
evidence.69
The legislative response to the change in policy set forth by
the Meese memorandum came in 1989. Sponsored primarily by
Democratic Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey and
Democratic Representative Bruce Morrison of Connecticut, what
came to be known as the Lautenberg Amendment originally was to
last only until September 30, 1990, a terminus explained by
Morrison as reflecting the recognition that "refugee conditions are
by nature fluid."7°
The Lautenberg Amendment comprised Sections 599D and
599E of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act.7 ' Section 599D provided that, in
addition to certain Indochinese, designated categories of aliens
at 173 (Appendix 3: Background Information on Soviet Emigrants, Prepared by
the6 8Department of State) (submitted by Rep. Howard Berman (D-California)).
Jew,Pentecostals Challenge,supra note 42, at 9.
69 Id.; H.R. REP. No. 101-122, at 9.
70 135 CONG. REC. 14,661 (1989).
7'Foreign Operations, Export Financing, & Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 1990, §§ 599D, 599E.
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from the Soviet Union would be presumed to be "targets of
persecution in the Soviet Union on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 2 These categories would be established by "the
Att6mey General, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Coordinator for Refugee Affairs," and were to include Jews,
Evangelical Christians, and members of the Ukrainian Catholic
and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches.7 3 Section 599E provided for
adjustment of the status of nationals from the Soviet Union,
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia who were inspected and paroled
into the United States from August 15, 1988, through September
30, 1990, to that of permanent residents, provided that they were
physically present in the United States for at least one year, applied
for the adjustment, and paid a fee for the processing of the
application.
There was some opposition to the Lautenberg Amendment.
Republican Representative Lamar Smith of Texas saw such
preference to selected groups as a bad precedent and also as unfair:
"We are saying basically that whoever gets in line and whoever
finds a political champion or whoever has enough political
influence, that
they can perhaps get special attention, get special
75
preference.,
Democratic Representative Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky
saw it as "a step backward," counter to the Refugee Act of 1980,
76
which eliminated national preferences in granting refugee status.
Other objections had been voiced in June in the House Judiciary
Committee by Republican Henry Hyde of Illinois. He spoke of the
unfairness of granting preference to Soviets without relatives in the
United States over Filipinos who might have to wait at least ten
years to be reunited with relatives. Additionally, he reprised and
foreshadowed an argument made by others by saying that 77
this was
people."
these
want
and
need
They
favor.
"doing Israel no
72

d. § 599D.

73 Id.

§ 599E, 103 Stat. at 1263.
135 CONG. REc. 14,664, 14,674.
76
Id. at 14,666.
77 House Judiciary Committee Approves Three Immigration Bills, 66 INTERP.
74 d.
75

REL. 675 (1989).
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Senator Simpson, although he did vote for the Lautenberg
Amendment, nevertheless expressed his reservations. As did
Mazzoli, he78referred to the Refugee Act's barring of national
preferences.
Despite this opposition, the amendment passed 97-0 in the
Senate and 358-44 in the House. 79 Three main arguments were
adduced in favor of the granting of presumptive refugee status to
the Soviet Jews and the others. As noted above, there was the
alleged hypocrisy in pressing the Soviet Union to let Jews emigrate
while denying the Jews admission to the United States on the
grounds that they were not persecuted. As Republican Senator
Rudolph Boschwitz of Minnesota stated, "we seem to be saying to
the Soviets: 'You 80were right, these people weren't really
persecuted after all.'
Second, as Senator Lautenberg stated, many Soviet Jews
applied to emigrate with the expectation of entering the United
States: "[T]hey gave up home, family, and friends to rely on the
81
U.S. Government's longstanding promise of resettlement."
Democratic Representative Gerry Sikorski of Minnesota,
responding to accusations that these groups were being given
special treatment, said that "the treatment we have been giving
them for the last 10 months is not very special in light of the
commitment we have made to them for the last 20 years."82
Third, there were numerous reports of inconsistencies and
biases on the part of INS interviewers. INS interviewers were
criticized for being cold and impersonal, an attitude which
"destroys any potential for a sense of trust essential to effective
communication of the highly personal information about the
applicant's religious life and persecution."8 3 Further, this
unwelcoming attitude ran counter to INS Guidelines which
"specifically encourage a warm, personal style with direct
84
communication with the applicant."
135 CONG. REc. 15,527 (1989).
Id. at 15,530, 14,680.
0 Id. at 15,523.

78
'9

'Id. at 15,516.
id.at 14,669.
83 135 CONG. REC. 15,520.
82
84

id.
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Additionally, there were cases where "personal bias ...
played a significant role in many of the denials"; this was
At times,
especially a problem with the Pentecostals.8 5
interviewers insisted that incidents of physical persecution or
arrests be recent. However, as Lynn Buzzard, Chairman of the
Soviet Refugee Legal Task Force, pointed out, "a well founded
very recent incidents or
fear [of persecution] doesn't require either
86
incidents."
personal
striking
particularly
The INS responded to criticism by "h[olding] a training
program aimed partly at achieving greater consistency," and also
by holding seminars to familiarize their officers with the history
87
and conditions of Pentecostals and Jews in the Soviet Union.
Additionally, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts pointed
to the handbook of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, used worldwide, which indicated that discrimination can
at times be tantamount to persecution, as when "measures of
discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial
nature for the person concerned, e.g., serious restrictions on his
right to earn his livelihood, his right to practice his88religion, or his
access to normally available educational facilities."
The Lautenberg Amendment itself, in an addition of
September 20 1989, spelled out how an applicant from one of the
enumerated groups could qualify for refugee status. The applicant
could point to:
[Such] acts of mistreatment, or prejudicial actions
against him or her personally [as an] inability to
study or practice religious beliefs or ethnic heritage
[or a] denial of access to educational, vocational or
technical institutions for which he or she is
otherwise qualified, based on membership in one of
the above categories [or] adverse treatment in the
attitudes
workplace stemming from prejudicial
89
category.
her
or
his
of
toward members

83

Id. at 15,520, 15,522.

Id.

at 15,522.
86
87 Id.at 15,518.
88 135 CONG. REc.
" Id. at 21,107.

15,526.
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Alternately, the applicant could point to "acts of
persecution committed against other persons in his or her category,
in his or her geographical locale; or acts, regardless of locale,
which give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution." 90 Another
possibility, based on the frequent oppression of Soviet Jews who
had applied for emigration visas, was to demonstrate "instances of
mistreatment or prejudicial actions based on his or her personal
request to depart his or her homeland, including, but not limited to,
loss of home, job, or educational opportunity." 91 Still expressing
Simpson
reservations about preference for certain groups, Senator
'9 2
proof.
of
burden
lesser
a
adding
"just
explained this as
The Armenians were a noteworthy omission from the
Lautenberg Amendment. Armenians, as did Jews, took advantage
of Gorbachev's liberalization of emigration policy. Also like the
Jews, the Armenians received considerable support from their
fellow ethnics upon arrival in the United States. Unlike the Jews,
however, the Soviet Armenians had a genuine ethnic homeland
within the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Armenian-American
community was ambivalent about emigration from Armenia.
Harut Sassounian, an Armenian-American newspaper editor and
publisher, referred to the Armenian diaspora as resulting from
persecution, especially by the Ottoman Empire: "Because of the
injustice we suffered... we all dream of one day returning to our
homeland., 93 He further expressed an attitude similar to that of
many Jews toward Jews who leave Israel: "When Armenians on
any part of our historical homeland leave Armenia, they go against
the struggle, against our goals," saying that while many recent
arrivals were his friends, "the interest of individuals is secondary
to the national interest." 94 Another editor, Ani Keshishian,
expressed a contrary attitude: "No one has the right to say, 'don't
go,' when you are not there yourself." 95

90Id.
91

Id.

92

Id. at 21,109.

93

From Yerevan to Hollywood, the Armenians Are Coming, REFUGEE REP.

at 8, 8-9.
(U.S.
94 Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 18, 1988,
id.
at 9.
95 id.
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At the same time, by early 1988 many Armenians were
being granted refugee status without even claiming to be victims of
persecution. Indeed, some even openly denied that they were
persecuted, acknowledging that they wanted to come to the United
States to improve their economic situation. 96 Some were being
denied refugee status, thereupon being given parole status instead;
the denial rate reached 85 percent in March 1989. 97 Whereas Jews
and Pentecostals favored presumptive eligibility for refugee status
for their own peoples, Ross Vartian, executive director of the
Armenian Assembly of America, had no problem supporting the
idea of special immigrant status for Armenians." It appears that
the Armenian-American community in general opposed the idea
that their fellow ethnics in the Soviet Union were victims of
persecution, and this opposition led to their exclusion from the
Lautenberg Amendment. 99 In addition to the desire to avoid
weakening Armenia, the historic preference for Russia, even
Soviet Russia, as a protector of the Armenians against Turkey
probably came into play.
AGAIN: USA OR ISRAEL?
As in the late 1970s, with the great increase in the 1980s of
Soviet Jewish emigration there was controversy over the Jews'
On February 18, 1987, Israeli Prime Minister
destination.
Yitzchak Shamir requested of Secretary of State Shultz that the
United States not grant refugee status to Soviet Jewish emigrants.
Shamir stated that since the emigrants were leaving the Soviet
Union on Israeli visas they were no longer refugees. This was
answered by Karl Zukerman, who said that since the Jews faced
religious persecution in the Soviet Union, they were indeed
Warren Eisenberg,
refugees according to international law.
96

Controversy Erupts Over Armenian Refugee Admissions, REFUGEE REP.

(U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), June 24, 1988 at 10, 10-11;
see also Refugee Hearings,supra note 44, at 163 (response of Nancy Kingsbury
to uestion of Bruce Morrison).
97REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 16,
1988, at 1, 1; Congress, Administration Offer Legislative Responses, supra note
55, at2.
98 Congress, Administration Offer Legislative Responses, supra note 55, at 4.
99 Newland, supra note 41, at 209.
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Director of the International Council of Bnai Brith, stated that
"[w]e support aliya [immigration to Israel], but we also support
freedom of choice," and Gary Rubin of the American Jewish
Committee said,
"it is not for us to tell Soviet Jews where they
°
should go."'0
On the other hand, some American Jews were expressing
doubts.
For example, Elaine Cooper, Director of National
Programs of the Zionist Organization of America, while not
advocating an end to refugee status for Soviet Jews, nevertheless
agreed that Jews with Israeli visas were not refugees. Morris
Abram, chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, said
that although his organization had not yet taken a position,
American Jews agreed "on the need for substantial and sustained
emigration from the Soviet Union . . . to Israel, and that the claim
01
for repatriation to Israel is a valid and compelling argument."' '
As had the Armenian-Americans, some Jewish Americans spoke
of the hypocrisy of insisting that their fellow ethnics live in a place
where they themselves had not chosen to live. 10 2 Meanwhile, a
State Department spokesman said that the administration favored
freedom of choice for the Soviet 0 Jews,
a view reiterated in
3
Shultz.1
Secretary
by
September 1988
While the debate over refugee status for Soviet Jews in the
United States continued, the debate over whether they should go to
Israel was rendered moot in the 1990s. In 1990-91, almost 400,000
Jews left the Soviet Union. Political scientist Sharon Stanton
Russell explained that "the sheer numbers of Jews permitted to
emigrate, coupled with the relative ease of obtaining a visa for
Israel, and the institution of more direct air and land transport
routes resulted in most Jewish emigrants--333,000--going to Israel;
66,000 went to the United States."
And although statistics vary,
100Israel Asks United States Not to Admit Soviet Jews as Refugees, REFUGEE
REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 20, 1987, at 13
[hereinafter Israel Asks United States].
101Id. at 14.
102See Michael R. Gordon, Exitfor Soviet Jews, Conflict for Americans, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14,
103Israel Asks

1988, § 4, at 2.

United States, supra note 100, at 13; Administration Reiterates

Support for "Freedom of Choice" for Soviet Jews, REFUGEE REP. (U.S.
Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 14, 1988, at 7, 7.
'04 Russell, supra note 5, at 71.
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a reasonable approximation is that in the 1990s, of slightly over
one million Jews who left the Soviet Union and its successor
states, over 800,000 went to Israel.10 5 Additionally, of course,
Israel not only had no maximum number of Jewish refugees that it
would accept but was eager to welcome as many Jewish
immigrants as possible.
REFUGEES IN THE 1990s
The Lautenberg Amendment achieved its purpose. A May
8, 1990, General Accounting Office report found that after the
amendment was passed, the percentage of applicants interviewed
in Moscow who were approved for refugee status in fiscal year
1990 increased from under seventy-eight to ninety." 6 On May 23,
Lautenberg and Morrison introduced legislation extending their
amendment for two years, to October 1, 1992.107 However, one
restriction was already coming into play. In the division of refugee
categories' into six priorities, 70 percent of Soviet applicants
were in the lowest priority: P6, for those with close ties, especially
of family, to the United States. Most of the others were in the P3
categories (spouses, unmarried sons or daughters, or parents of
persons in the United States) or the P5 category (married sons or
daughters, siblings, grandparents, or grandchildren). Many of the
Soviet Jews qualified under P3 or P5, and the United States
increasingly preferred to give priority under P6 to evangelical
Christians, many of whom lacked relatives in the United States.
Therefore, already the State Department was predicting the
unlikelihood of Soviet Jewish P6 applicants gaining refugee status
for several years. Arnold Leibowitz, Washington counsel to HIAS,
pointed out that there would be enough P3 and P5 applicants to
105 Statistics,

Jewish Emigrationfrom the Former Soviet Union & the United
States (updated January 27, 2003) at http://ncsj.org/stats.shtml (last visited May
4, 2003).
106 Amendment Introduced to Extend Lower Refugee Threshold for Soviet
Jews, Evangelicals, and Other Category Groups, REFUGEE REP. (U.S.
Committee
for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), June 22, 1990, at 8, 8.
07
1

Id.

10s The Washington Processing Center: One Year Later, 67 INTERP. REL.

1120, 1120-21 (1990).
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fulfill the maximum
quota, even if more individuals would be
09
entry.1
denied
Then came a watershed. On May 20, 1991, the Soviet
Parliament approved a law, to take effect January 1, 1993,
allowing freedom of travel and emigration. As the New York
Times noted, this codified a process that had been occurring de
facto under Gorbachev."10 Additionally, the Soviet Union dropped
its requirement that invitations to immigrate be made by close
family members. Accordingly, there would potentially be a huge
increase in the number of immigrants. As Refugee Reports noted,
"most countries, with the exception of Israel, would probably be
i
averse to receiving large numbers of Soviet immigrants."'' '
As it happened, fairly large numbers of Jewish immigrants
did enter the United States after the breakup of the Soviet Union,
but at the same time standards were tightened and the numbers
decreased. From the start of the Lautenberg Amendment until Fall
1999, more than one million refugee applicants underwent review,
of whom over 420,000 former Soviets entered the United States,
with a high of 61,298 in 1992. However, the numbers declined
every year after 1992: to 27,072 in fiscal year 1997, 23,349 in
fiscal year 1998, and approximately 16,900 in fiscal year 1999, and
a projected (as of September 2000, with one month to go in the
fiscal year) 14,000 in 2000. Concurrently with this went a drop in
the ceiling for refugees from the former Soviet Union, from 26,000
in fiscal year 1998 to 23,000 in fiscal year 1999, 20,000 in 2000,
and 17,000 for 2001.1 12 Moreover, the proportion of applicants
109 Id. The refugee categories were developed for use at the Washington, D.C.

Processing Center, established in 1989 to process the applications of Soviet
refugees, Administration Proposes Admitting 125,000 Refugees Next Year, 66
INTERP. REL. 1029, 1030 (1989).
. 110 Esther B. Fein, Soviets Enact Law Freeing Migration and Trips Abroad,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1991, at Al.
11 Soviet Processing: A First-Hand Account from Moscow, REFUGEE REP.
(U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 30, 1991, at 10, 12.
112 Trouble-shooting U.S. Refugee Processing in the Former Soviet Union
and
Egypt, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.),

Sept./Oct. 1999, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Trouble-shooting U.S. Refugee Processing];
see also From 90,000 to 72,000 and Counting: U.S. Refugee Admissions
Shortfall Expected for FY 2000, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees,
Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2000, at 1, 6 [hereinafter From 90,000 to 72,000 and
Counting].
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who were Jews declined to only about 50 percent by 1998, with
13
Evangelical Christians accounting for most of the rest."
Evangelical Christians, of course, did not have the same option of
refuge in Israel.
Still, the Lautenberg Amendment has been continually
renewed, and unlike most former Soviets who need to show a
"well-founded fear of persecution" to gain refugee status, the
designated groups need only state that they fear persecution
and
4
demonstrate a "credible basis of concern" in that regard. "
That concern persisted even after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, although the precise locus of the concern shifted.
For example, there was considerable consternation at the success
of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's right-wing Liberal Democratic Party 1in
15
the December 1995 elections to the Russian parliament.
Although Zhirinovsky soon appeared to be a spent force in Russian
politics, anti-Semitic incidents persisted throughout the 1990s,
including bombings of synagogues, physical attacks on Jewish
leaders and institutions in various parts of Russia, and anti-Semitic
remarks from opposition Russian politicians and local governors,
ranging from Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov's complaints
about excessive Jewish presence in the media to right-winger
Albert Makashov's call to send all Jews to their graves. Although
the official anti-Semitism of the Soviet period was absent from the
top levels of the Russian government, the situation was perhaps
best expressed by Paul Goble, Senior Fellow at the Potomac
Foundation, who in 1996, referred to the anti-Semitism in the
former Soviet Union as having been "privatized: that is,
governments do not effectively control the manifestation of this
ancient evil .... 116
In March 1999, Diana Aviv, Director of the Washington
office of the Council of Jewish Federations (CJF), referred to antiSemitism in the successor states as "virulent, pervasive, and
113 FSU Refugee Resettlement Drops, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for
Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 28, 1998, at 6, 7.
114 d.
"5 PoliticalClimate in Former Soviet Union Darkens; Attitudes Toward Jews,
Uncertain, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.),

Mar./Apr. 1996, at 1, 1.
116 Id. at2.
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increasingly violent," and said that the CJF supported a further
extension of the Lautenberg Amendment: "Our hope was that it
would not be necessary to renew this amendment, that the situation
would change for the better. Sadly, this is clearly not
the case.
117
horizon."
the
on
is
improvement
that
Nor does it appear
STRICTER ENFORCEMENT
REFUGEE STATUS

OF

STANDARDS

FOR

Despite the persistence of such problems, however, there
was continued questioning of the need for refugee status for Soviet
Jews. Alan Simpson continued to be a vocal opponent. Speaking
against an extension of the Lautenberg Amendment on the Senate
floor on February 1, 1994, he pointed out that there was "unofficial
discrimination against groups" in the United States as well, but that
that did not make them, or similar Soviet groups, refugees. 1 8 On
another occasion, pointing out that roughly 85 percent of refugees
were leaving their home countries for the United States without
having to flee, Simpson said, "[it] appears to me that our refugee
program has become for the most part an immigration
program in
119
funding."
refugee
with
and
refugee clothing,
After Simpson retired in 1997, his successor as chair of the
Senate immigration subcommittee, Republican Spencer Abraham
of Michigan, was more sympathetic toward refugees. Abraham
expressed doubts in a July 31, 1997 hearing about the American
policy of lowering the number of refugees it was accepting. Also,
as had many others, he expressed concern20over manifestations of
anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union.'

117

"Culture of Negativism" Debated at CongressionalRefugee Hearing, 20

REFUGEE REP.

(U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Mar./Apr.

1999, at 1, 18.
",8

140 CONG. REc. 638 (1994).

International and Domestic Political Developments Spark Debate Over
Future of Refugee Resettlement Program, REFUGEE REP. (U.S. Committee for
Refugees, Washington, D.C.), June 30, 1994, at 1, 3 [hereafter Developments
1'9

Spark Debate].
120 Refugee Admissions Remain Level For FY 98: Bosnian Admissions
to
Increase While Former Soviet Admissions Decline, REFUGEE REP. (U.S.

Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 29, 1997, at 8, 8.
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Nevertheless, the numbers continued to decrease.
Although refugees admitted under the Lautenberg Amendment are
not required to have family in the United States, the Washington
Processing Center said in early 1998 that it only considered
applicants who had a parent, child, sibling, or grandparent as a
sponsor. According to Refugee Reports, the State Department
inaugurated this policy in order to make the number of applicants
more manageable when it greatly increased in the early 1990s. As
it was, in early 1998 the Washington Processing Center had files of
an estimated 80,000 people who could conceivably have qualified
12
as Lautenberg refugees but lacked such family sponsors.
Moreover, as Soviet Jewish refugees in the United States were able
to bring their families over, there was a decline in the number of
Jews remaining in the former Soviet Union who still had American
relatives. 22 This led to the steady decrease in admissions in the
1990s. 23 Another possibility was that the people who most wanted
to leave the former Soviet Union for United States and Israel had
done so4 as soon as possible, leaving behind many who preferred to
2
stay.'
Additionally, there were other factors that kept the number
of applicants down. For a long time even after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union the INS interviewed applicants from any of the
former Soviet republics only in Moscow. Accordingly, the
necessity of traveling to Moscow made applying for refugee status
financially prohibitive for some potential applicants, to say nothing
of bureaucratic difficulties involved in traveling from other former
Soviet republics, now separate states, to Russia.' 25 Additionally,
there were cases when people certified as refugees by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were denied
refugee status by the INS. This, coupled with the lack of INS
circuit rides to outlying areas, often caused the UNHCR to be
discouraged from referring refugee cases to the United States. As
121FSURefugee Resettlement Drops, supra note

113, at 8.
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Trouble-shootingUS. Refugee Processing,supra note 112, at 2.
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Landsberg, Russian Emigration Rising; Most Russians Who Seek a

New Life in the United States are Jews, TULSA WORLD, January 17, 1999,
availableat 1999 WL 5387430.
125FSU Refugee Resettlement Drops, supra note 113, at 9.
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one official said: "We avoid approaching the United States about
high-risk cases. It takes too long, and we lose control of the case.
This is unfortunate, since the United States has such a large
26
quota."',
However, the United States finally responded early in fiscal
year 2000 by instituting circuit rides, serving mostly Lautenberg
refugees but also some category P-1 referrals from the UNHCR in
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, and there
27
was talk of extending the circuit rides to St. Petersburg as well. 1
An additional concern, stated, not surprisingly, by Senator
Simpson, was that some people were fraudulently entering the
United States as Lautenberg refugees.
In December 1995,
Simpson had printed into the CongressionalRecord a November 4
Washington Times article which quoted the INS director in
Moscow, Leonard Kovensky, as saying that some applicants
brought passports showing that they were ethnically Russian, but
because one grandparent was Jewish, the rules required that they
be given visas. In addition, a Pentecostal leader told the INS that
many people were falsely claiming to be Pentecostals in order to
acquire refugee status, and Kovensky said that "[m]any reliable
sources" had told the INS of classes for people to learn how to pass
as Pentecostals in their interviews with the INS.28 In 1996, the
State Department Inspector General's Office referred to fraudulent
documentation and also to the fact that it was not necessary to
prove membership in the designated categories, only to state it.
Because of this fraud, INS officials in Moscow favored ending the
Lautenberg program as early as 1993, but both then and in 1996,
attempts led by the State Department to do so were unsuccessful.
Moreover, several INS officers complained of being ignored when
they called for a crackdown on fraud and unfounded allegations of
persecution; the officers were requesting criminal background
checks and equipment capable of detecting forged documents.
Applicants often claimed that they had lost their Soviet passports,
which contained a line indicating the bearer's nationality (ethnic
group), presenting other papers of dubious provenance instead. At
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Trouble-shooting U.S. Refugee Processing,supra note 112, at 2.

"2From 90,000 to 72,000 and Counting, supra note 112, at 6.
CONG. REc. 37,058 (1995).
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of the Boston Globe,
the same time, according to Stephen Kurkjian
1 29
was.
fraud
such
extensive
how
no one knew
Despite the alleged fraud and the complaints by the INS
officials that their superiors often challenged their rejection of
applications, 130 increasing numbers of applicants were being
rejected. As early as 1992, Jack Matlock, former American
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was quoted as saying, "[i]t's
going to be hard to make a case of discrimination against you by
13 1
Everybody is having a pretty rough time.'
officialdom.
Particularly by the end of the decade, growing numbers of
applicants were denied refugee status because of an inability to
prove persecution. Daniel Retter, a New York lawyer handling
such cases, was cited in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel to the
effect that some rejected applicants appeared to satisfy the
that interviewing
requirements of the Lautenberg Amendment and
' 32
"adversarial."'
increasingly
seemed
in Moscow
Senator Lautenberg himself, in a letter to the editor of the
Boston Globe in answer to the allegations of fraud, stated that his
amendment "in no way encourages immigration officials to relax
their standards regarding fraudulent applications." He further
stated that "Russian Jews are having greater difficulty these days
qualifying for refugee status under my amendment. In fact,
lawyers who handle these cases say the interview process has
gotten tougher and fewer applications are winning approval." At
the same time, referring to anti-Semitic incidents in the former
Soviet Union in 1998 and 1999, specifically the explosion of
bombs near Moscow synagogues and the July 1999 stabbing of a
Jewish leader in Moscow's Choral Synagogue, he concluded:
The
"Victims of this persecution deserve our protection.
Lautenberg Amendment gives them that help. And it sends an

129

Stephen Kurkjian, Russian Refugees Skirt Regulations to Flood US.,

BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1999, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File.
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important signal that the
United States still leads the world in
' 133
protecting human rights."
CONCLUSION
On April 6, 1989, INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson,
testifying before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
correctly noted that while emigration was an internationally
recognized right, immigration is a "privilege granted by sovereign
governments."'1 34 Yet at the same time, while acknowledging this
legal disparity, some people suggested that there was a moral
equivalence created by American raising of the Soviet Jews'
expectations of reception in the United States.
Nevertheless, the sheer number of immigrants beginning in
1988 led to rethinking and then change in American policy. In
effect, the Lautenberg Amendment served as a sort of compromise
between, on the one hand, the statutory numerical limitations on
refugee admissions and the sovereign right of the United States to
restrict immigration, and on the other hand, the implicit moral
obligation perceived by some people. As discussed above, there
has been some opposition to the Lautenberg Amendment, most
prominently from Senator Alan Simpson, but there was never
much, and the Lautenberg Amendment is still being renewed.
Paula Stern has noted that Henry Jackson:
was aided by a reputation among his congressional
colleagues as a specialiston Soviet affairs among a
body of generalists ... . When it comes time for
the Congress as a whole to consider a particular
issue - - for example, trade relations with the Soviet
Union -- the views of those members like Jackson
specializing in the field have a disproportionate
influence over35 the rest of the Senate and House
membership.'
Frank Lautenberg, Letter to the Editor, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1989, at
F6, availableat 1999 WL 6077124.
133
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A similar situation may have obtained with regard to the
Lautenberg Amendment. Support for the Lautenberg Amendment
may also have resulted as much from the lack of passionate
objection to it, Simpson and others notwithstanding, as from any
consideration of the relative merits of different claimants to
refugee status. Additionally, of course, there was the desire not to
abandon the Soviet Jews or to be seen as abandoning them: a moral
principle amounting to a sort of stare decisis in refugee policy.
The specific role of Jewish lobbying is hard to assess.
Examples of testimony by representatives of Jewish organizations
have been cited above, in addition to the ambivalent attitude of
Jewish groups toward whether to encourage free choice of
destination rather than solely immigration to Israel. Sources on
examples of lobbying, such as campaign contributions or letter
writing to Congressmen, are less available. Certainly in the 1990s,
Jewish groups were active in calling attention to the persistence of
anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union, and this may have
helped keep the Lautenberg Amendment alive. At the same time,
given the overwhelming bipartisan support for the Lautenberg
Amendment, and for that matter, issues concerning Soviet Jews in
general, it is most likely that Jewish lobbying reinforced rather
than caused such support. And certainly there were limits: no
amount of lobbying could ever have induced the United States to
admit one million former Soviet Jews as refugees in the 1990s.
Moreover, official repression of Jews in the Soviet Union
and its successor states declined steeply, even if there were still
anti-Semitic incidents (as there are in the United States, even if the
United States lacks the same tragic history with respect to
treatment of Jews). As Petrus Buwalda, Dutch ambassador to the
Soviet Union from 1986 to 1990, pointed out, "under Gorbachev
the situation of Soviet Jews was no longer so precarious as to
generate the political and financial support needed for a
36
continuation of the old policy."1
This ambivalence led to an unusual policy toward Jews
from the former Soviet Union. Simpson is quoted above as
referring to the Lautenberg program as an "immigration program
in refugee clothing."' 37 Even Buwalda, who was a more
136 BUWALDA, supra note 21, at 197.
137 See Developments Spark Debate, supra note

119, at 3.
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sympathetic observer, similarly wrote: "In fact, the refugee
program became a converted immigration program: only close
relatives of American citizens could henceforth hope to qualify,
38 More accurately, what the Lautenberg program became was
sui generis, a hybrid program whose applicants simultaneously had
to meet lesser standards as refugees and ordinary standards as
immigrants, whereupon family-sponsored immigrants would be
treated as the equivalent of immediate family.
The additional ambivalence reflected in the persistence of
the Lautenberg program is that of the United States toward Russia,
its former Cold War rival. Just as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization has expanded partly out of a sense of vigilance (or
paranoia) about the possible but unlikely resurgence of a militant
Russia, so the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, despite being waived
for Russia and other countries that comply with it, is still on the
books despite Russia's granting of the right to emigrate (even
embedding this right into article 27 of its Constitution), 39 and
despite Russia's no longer having a "nonmarket economy." Thus,
the United States continues to insist that the Soviet Union grant
Jews the right to emigrate to Israel while not offering many of
them admission itself, a not unprecedented type of American
moralizing. As the New York Times pointed out in 1992:
One bureaucratic detail seems to symbolize the
topsy-turvy nature of the changed Soviet-American
relationship. In the past, when a Soviet citizen
wished to travel abroad, his Government forced him
to leave behind a close family member to help
insure his return. Now it is American consular
officials in Moscow who often require that a family
member be left behind as proof
that a tourist does
140
not intend to overstay his visa.
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Although this refers to admission of nonimmigrant visitors
(hence presumed immigrants) rather than to refugee admissions,
American immigration restrictions in general, whether of
immigrants, nonimmigrants, or refugees, have created an irony. In
the post-Cold War world, now that former citizens of the successor
states to the Soviet Union have the right to emigrate, for many of
them, as well as for many people of other nationalities throughout
the world, the iron curtain is at the American border.
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